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This paper considers a community where contracting institutions are weak. If social sanctions
against opportunism rise in times of stress, then some good projects may be born out of
misfortune.
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1.  Introduction 
 
  It is often said that tragedy brings out the best in people.  In times of crisis, 
neighbors who never spoke to one another are willing to help one another rebuild.  There 
is often an increased sense of common purpose, but this community spirit falls far short 
of the actual losses suffered.  Further, it is often the case that aid, both foreign and 
domestic, tends to flow in after a natural disaster.  Nevertheless, there is no reason to 
suppose that this aid does anything but attempt to rebuild the destroyed capital stock.   
Here we argue that, in contexts where contracting is particularly weak, a shift in norms in 
response to a tragedy can lead to good projects being undertaken that would have 
otherwise not been pursued without the disaster.   
  This paper begins by describing a socially beneficial project that is not initiated 
because of ex post opportunism.  Then we introduce the concept of social sanctions and 
show how rises in community involvement and outrage against opportunism can reduce 
excessive, ex post wage demands.  We put this in the context of a simple example, and 
then conclude. 
 
2. Hold-up  model 
 
  Here we present a stylized hold-up problem.
1  The essential feature of this 
problem is that the agent can renegotiate her contract after some funds have already been 
sunk.  Further, we assume that the parties have been unable to design contractual 
remedies to correct this project and facilitate investment. 
  Suppose that there is a project, which we will for convenience call a “bridge,” 
with a gross social benefit of V.  It costs I to undertake.   This project takes two periods to 
build by an agent.  The agent incurs a cost of I1 in period one and a cost of I2 in period 2, 
where   
  12 . I II ≡ +  (1) 
 
The gross social value also varies by period.  The project has the characteristic that its net 
social benefit is only nonnegative if it is completed.  For example, a “bridge” that only 
extends half the distance across a river is not worth producing, V1 – I1 < 0.    Yet, it may 
have some benefit as a “fishing pier,” V1 > 0.  Nevertheless, the net social surplus from 













  An agent is paid wages each period of W1 in period 1 and W2 in period 2.  
  We will assume that the social welfare-maximizing principal with access to 
financial capital will approach a credit-constrained agent to build the bridge.
2   This 
                                                 
1 Grout (1984) is the classic reference to the hold-up problem. 
2 The principal could be a private investor, a government entity, or non-governmental organizations (NGO) 
such as the World Bank or the charity Oxfam.   2
principal will fund all projects that have a positive (social) net present value (NPV) and 
thus do not divert investment funds from other socially valuable projects.  This means 
that the bridge will be built if expected wages are less than or equal to the gross value of 
the project, W1 + W2 < V1 + V2.   
  Further, we will assume that this principal will maximize social surplus from the 
present period going forward, and will fund the bridge in period 2 if W2 < V2.  If the 
principal could commit to be tough in period 2 and not pay any W2 > V2 + V1 – I1, then it 
would be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that the bridge would always be built.  The 
principal’s objective of maximizing social surplus going forward means that the principal 
cannot commit to refuse high wage demands of V2 > W2 > V2 + V1 – I1. 
  The agent, on the other hand, wishes to maximize her profit Π = W1 + W2 – I1 – I2.  
Further, long-term, multi-period contracts cannot be enforced with the agent.  The 
principal can be counted on to compensate the agent for any promised price.  
Nevertheless, the agent cannot commit to honor multi-period contracts.  Further, we will 
assume that the agent must be compensated for all costs incurred each period.  Therefore, 
the minimum wage that the agent must be paid in period 1 to produce is W1 > I1.
3   
  Let us also assume that the principal has all the bargaining power at the outset of 
the project, but the agent has all the bargaining power in the middle of the project in 
period 2.  The hold-up problem here stems from fact that the agent has all the bargaining 
power after the investment is partially sunk.  The social planner cannot prevent the agent 
from renegotiating the compensation arrangement once the first section of the bridge has 
been completed.   Using backwards induction, regardless of what period 2 wage the agent 
originally agreed to receive, the agent will demand that she be paid V2 in period 2.  
Therefore, without social sanctions the principal will expect to pay at least I1 + V2, which 
exceeds the gross social benefit of V1 + V2.  Therefore, the principal will never 
commission the bridge. 
 
Proposition 1 
It is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that the “bridge” will not be commissioned 
without social sanctions. 
 
3.  Social Sanctions 
 
  The opportunistic behavior of the agent occurs, in part, because the social planner 
cannot impose penalties for opportunistic behavior.   Here we argue that penalties are 
functions of the social environs that the agent inhabits.   Community monitoring and 
intolerance of opportunism will help prevent hold-up problems soon after a crisis.  The 
tragedy temporarily works to intensify the community involvement and the community’s 
level of devotion to the “social good.” 
    If the agent can renegotiate without her peers observing this behavior, she need 
not fear social sanctions.  On the other hand, if the sanctions have no teeth it does not 
                                                 
3 This assumption is necessary, but not unreasonable in the context of a developing economy.  If the agent 
can behave opportunistically with the principal, she also will likely be able to behave opportunistically with 
potential investors.  This opportunism will likely make the agent credit constrained.  If an agent has a 
beginning wealth of zero or cannot commit her wealth to the project, then social planner must pay the 
agent’s costs.     3
matter if the agent operates in secret or not.  Suppose there is a social sanction function 
s(p, r), where p is the probability of the community detecting the agent’s opportunism, 
and r is the “rage” or penalty the community is willing to impose on an agent who has 
been discovered to be opportunistic.   
  The probability of detection, 1 > 22 , p WI
M
μ ⎛⎞ − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 > 0, is a function of two 
arguments.  There are M members of the community, μ < M is the number of members 
who are actively monitoring opportunism.   W2 – I2 is the measure of the opportunism of 
the agent.  Let us denote partial derivatives of the first and second arguments by the 
subscripts 1 and 2, respectively.  The probability of detection is increasing in both the 
fraction of the population monitoring opportunism,  ,
M
μ
 and the greed of the agent, W2 – 
I2.  Thus, p1, p2 > 0.  Further, monitoring and the agent’s payoff from opportunism are 
weakly complimentary.  Therefore, the cross partial is p12 > 0.  In general, we would 
assume that no monitoring, μ = 0, would lead to a zero probability of detection, p(0, W2 – 
I2) = 0.   In the aftermath of a natural disaster, it is not uncommon for communities to 
participate en masse in public works projects.  If many members of the community begin 
to work beside the agent, then it will be much harder to conceal opportunism.  
  The social outrage is also a function of two arguments r(ρ, W2 – I2) > 0.  ρ > 0 is 
the exogenously determined level of rage against opportunism.  In times of tragedy, one’s 
peers may react very negatively to opportunism.  For example, if the “bridge” is 
necessary to transport supplies to starving communities on the other side, profiteering 
may not be tolerated.  Nevertheless, if the agent is needed to resurface an already well-
paved road, social outrage may be minimal.  High ρ means high outrage.  Thus r1 > 0.  
Further, like detection outrage is increasing in the level of profiteering and r2 > 0.  
Finally, higher levels of exogenous outrage ρ and profiteering W2 – I2 are weakly 
compliments r12 > 0.  No outrage, ρ = 0, or no profiteering, will generally lead to no 
social sanctions. 
  Let us decompose the social sanction function into two components. 
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  The expected sanction,  () , s •  is the probability of detection, () , p •  times the 
punishment for detection,  ( ). r •  
  In period 2, when renegotiating her compensation, the agent will want to choose a 
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We will assume that E{Π2} is twice differentiable and concave with a negative second 
derivative everywhere.  Under normal circumstances in disinterested communities where 
contracting institutions are weak, one may expect that the social sanctions function would   4
be sufficiently weak such that the agent would choose the maximal W2 = V2.  Let us 
concern ourselves with the cases where there is an interior solution where expected profit 
is maximized at 
*
22 2 (,) WI V ∈ .  In this case, the first order condition (FOC) is as follows: 
 


















The superscript stars indicate that the functions are evaluated at W2
* while the subscripts 
signify that the first partials of the second argument, W2 – I2, of the probability of 
detection function and the outrage function, respectively. 
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Combining equations (6) and (7), the second period wage demands of the contractor are 
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Suppose that the agent would demand neither the maximum wage nor the minimum wage 
in period 2 before the shock.  A small increase in public monitoring, μ, or social 
penalties, ρ, decrease the agent’s period 2 wage demands. 
 
This follows from the comparative statics in equations (8) and (9) above. 
As long as 
*
2121 , WIV V +≤+  social sanctions can guarantee that the “bridge” is 
built.  Otherwise, it is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that the bridge is never 
commissioned.  Therefore, we could imagine that a tragedy, such as a natural disaster, 
may lead to a rise in μ and ρ and a fall in the agent’s wage demands.  Suppose that before 
the tragedy, the bridge was never commissioned, despite its social benefits.  In some   5
cases after the tragedy, rises in μ and ρ will cause the equilibrium wage demand to fall to 
the point where it is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that the bridge is built.   
 
4.  Worked out example 
 
  For purposes of illustration in this section, we will write down an explicit sanction 



















ρ −≡ − (11) 
 



















  The first and second order conditions are  
 














































  In the figure below, we plot the agents’ wages as a function of the multiple of the 




 compliment higher sanctions, ρ.  Investment is only feasible when the agents’ gross 








  This is where the period 2   6
wage is the maximum for which investment is feasible 
2
*
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 in (16) exceeds unity.  This means 
that, in this example if 
M
μ
ρ  is less than or equal to 1, then no investment will be 
undertaken.   7
    
 
 
Figure 1:   






5.  Conclusion  
 
  This paper has presented a theory of how some good can come of out a 
community disaster.  This model is meant to apply to developing economies where 
socially profitable investments are “held up” by contracting problems.  After a disaster 
community intolerance for opportunism may serve as an alternative enforcement 
mechanism that facilitates valuable investment.   The model also demonstrates that long-
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